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I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING 
1. Defendant Sherron L. Boren Was Granted A Testamentary 
Special Power of Appointment 
The power of appointment granted to Defendant Sherron L. Boren is 
one that is to be exercised upon her death. Until it is determined that 
Defendant Sherron L. Boren' s properly exercised her power of appointment, 
the terms of the Trust documents control the distribution of the Trust assets. 
Paragraph 6.22 of the Master Trust states: 
"[W]hen Settler's Spouse is no longer living and no child of 
Settlor is living who is under age twenty-one(21 ), the entire 
principal of the trust shall be distributed to or for the benefit of 
any one or more of Settler's issue, or Spouses of Settler's 
deceased issue, as Settlor' s Spouse shall appoint by exercise of 
a testamentary exclusive special power of appointment, which 
power shall be exercised by a will made after Settlor's death 
which specifically refers to the power of appointment herein 
given to Settlor' s Spouse. Any appointment by Settlor' s 
Spouse may be of such estates and interest upon such terms, 
trusts, conditions, powers and limitations as Settler's Spouse 
shall determine. Any appointment may exclude any one or 
more of the beneficiaries of the class. If, or to the extent that, 
Settler's Spouse does not exercise said testamentary special 
power of appointment at the death of the Settler's Spouse, said 
principal shall pass according to the terms governing ultimate 
distribution set forth in Paragraph 7 of the J oinder Agreement. 
(000150). 
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The above language requires multiple steps before Defendant Sherron 
L. Boren' s testamentary special power of appointment can be deemed to be 
valid. Until those events occur, the terms of the Trust control the 
distribution of the Trust assets. 
Defendant Sherron L. Boren relies·on Montrone v. Valley Bank and 
Trust Co .• 875 P.2d 557 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The facts in Montrone are 
clearly different from this case. In Montrone, Anna Montrone set up a 
revocable trust with herself as the sole beneficiary during her lifetime. Ms. 
Montrone retained the absolute power to modify, alter or revoke the trust at 
anytime by notifying the Trustee in writing. Ms. Montrone subsequently 
exercised that power be directing the Trustee not to distribute certain 
information to the residuary beneficiaries of the Trust. The Court of 
Appeals found that because Ms. Montrone, as the Settlor, retained the 
general power of appointment, she retained the right to negate the Trustee's 
duty to account to the residuary beneficiaries of the Trust. Defendant 
Sherron L. Boren lacks that general power. 
The facts in this case are more closely analogous to those in Burgess 
v. Poulsen, 836 P.2d 1386, 1389-90 (Utah App.1992). In that case, Dr. J. 
Paul Burgess, a widower with three sons, married Mala Poulsen. Mala 
2 
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,-.6) 
Poulsen had no children. Dr. Burgess executed a will which created a 
marital trust if Mrs. Burgess survived him. In the trust provisions of his will, 
Dr. Burgess granted to Mrs. Burgess a general power of appointment over 
the Marital Trust which would enable her to distribute the Marital Trust 
estate through her will stating: 
"Upon the death of Mala P. Burgess, the remaining principal, 
including any uncollected and/ or undistributed income shall be 
paid over, delivered, assigned, transferred or conveyed to and 
among such appointee or appointees, including her estate, and 
in any proportions and in any manner as she shall direct by Will 
in expressly intending to exercise this power by making specific 
reference therein to said power .... " 
After Dr. Burgess died, Ms. Burgess executed a will and a codicil. 
Neither instrument specifically mentioned the power of appointment under 
the Marital Trust. The Court of Appeals found that although Ms. Burgess 
may have intended to exercise her power of appointment, her failure to 
strictly comply with the instructions of Dr. Burgess to specifically reference 
the power of appointment meant that her attempts to exercise that power 
failed. 
The Burgess case is important to the standing issue of the Plaintiffs 
for two reasons. First, there is no evidence in the record that Defendant 
3 
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Sherron L. Boren executed the necessary testamentary documents to validly 
exercise her special power of appointment. Absent that evidence, the terms 
of the Trust are presumed to control and the Plaintiff remain beneficiaries of 
the Trust. Second, the power to appoint that was conveyed to Defendant 
Sherron L. Boren is a testamentary power. That power may only be 
exercised on the death of Defendant Sherron L. Boren. Until her death, her 
exercise of the power is speculative and transitory. Defendant Sherron L. 
Boren may at anytime revoke or change her power of appointment. Her 
attempts to exercise that power may ultimately be determined to be invalid 
by a court. Until Defendant Sherron L. Boren' s death, the only controlling 
exercise of power are the terms of the Trust documents. Again, under the 
terms of the Trust the Plaintiffs remain beneficiaries and they retain their 
rights and thus have standing to protect those rights. 
2. The Plaintiffs Maintain the Necessary Interest for 
Standing 
Plaintiffs' complaint raised questions regarding the circumstances 
surrounding the execution of the First and Second Amendments to the Trust. 
Plaintiffs requested declaratory judgment concerning their respective rights 
and obligations under the Trust. Plaintiffs' Complaint paragraphs 8, 9 and 
4 
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56. (000001-000011). The provision of the Master Trust which purportedly 
reserves the right to amend or revoke the Trust is somewhat confusing. The 
applicable paragraph repeatedly references the Trust being an Unfunded Life 
Insurance Trust. Paragraph 4 of the Master Trust (000145). When the 
Master Trust was executed, the Settlor also executed a Joinder Agreement. 
(000157). The Joinder Agreement was signed by Duane Boren, Sharrol Ann 
Anderton, Duane Boren, Jr., Mary Ellen Blanchard and Terry Lee Monks. 
There is no language in the J oinder Agreement concerning whether the 
Settlor reserved the exclusive right to make amendments or modifications to 
the J oinder Agreement. 
It is well settled that the parties to a contract may modify all or any 
portion of that contract. Western Sur. Co. v. Murphy, 754 P.2d 1237, 1239 
(Utah App.1988) ( quoting Rapp v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co .. 606 
P.2d 1189, 1191 (Utah 1980)). In order to consider the enforcement of a 
modified contract, the Court must find that there has been "a meeting of the 
minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or 
impliedly, with sufficient definiteness." Pingree v. Continental Group of 
Utah. Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976). Although there is evidence 
that the Settlor intended to reserve the right to unilaterally modify the Master 
5 
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Trust Agreement through the confusing language of paragraph 4 of the 
Master Trust Agreement, there is no evidence within the Joinder Agreement 
that the Settlor intended to reserve that same right regarding amendments or 
modifications of the J oinder Agreement. Absent an unambiguous provision 
allowing modification by the Settlor, the Joinder Agreement could only be 
modified by the parties to that agreement. Two subsequent amendments 
were made to the Joinder Agreement. (000161-000167). Both amendments 
were purportedly signed by Duane Boren and Sherron Lea Boren. Neither 
amendments were signed by the other parties to the J oinder Agreement, 
Duane Boren, Jr., Mary Ellen Blanchard and Terry Lee Monks. Whether the 
amendments are valid is a matter for the Trial Court to decide first, not the 
appellate courts. Because their rights under the Trust will be significantly 
impacted by the Trial Court's determination of rights under the Trust 
documents, the Plaintiffs' have standing to protect those rights. 
In addition, to protecting their rights under the original Trust 
documents, the Plaintiffs do retain interests even under the subsequent 
amendments. The Defendant acknowledges that the Plaintiffs have an 
interest in the waste ground, a portion of the mineral rights and the rest, 
residue and remainder of the estate. Defendant's Brief page 26-27. A 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
significant portion of the Plaintiffs' complaints have centered on Defendant 
David L. Boren, using Trust assets to subsidize his personal obligations in 
running the fann. Defendant David L. Boren has repeatedly operated the 
fann at a loss. The Trust has significant income from oil and gas leases. 
Defendant David L. Boren used the royalties from the oil and gas leases to 
subsidize his operation of the farm. See Plaintiffs' Opening Brief pages 33-
34. The money from the royalties should either be distributed to the income 
beneficiary or place in a bank account to be available to the residuary 
beneficiaries of the Trust. The money should not be used by Defendant 
David L. Boren to subsidize his personal expenses as they relate to the 
operation of the farm. The Plaintiffs have a significant interest in obtaining 
an accounting of these funds along with the operation of the farm because 
they have a right to the residual estate. 
Because the Plaintiffs retain an interest in their rights under the Trust 
and because the Plaintiffs retain their specific right to the residual estate, the 
Plaintiffs have standing to pursue this matter. The Court should deny 
Defendant Sherron L. Boren' s challenge to the Plaintiffs' standing. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff Duane Boren, Jr. submitted not only a Declaration which 
7 
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properly stated that facts necessary to defeat summary judgment, he included 
12 Exhibits that also supported his claims. The Defendants have never 
challenged the authenticity or the accuracy of any of those exhibits. These 
exhibits included the following: 
247) 
295) 
Exhibit A- The Master Trust Agreement (000221-233) 
Exhibit B- The Joinder Agreement (000234-238) 
Exhibit C-The First Amendment to the Trust (000239-241) 
Exhibit D-The Second Amendment to the Trust (000242-245) 
Exhibit E- Letter to Clark Allred requesting an accounting ( 000246-
Exhibit F-The Fann Agreement (000248-250) 
Exhibit G- Ledger provided by the Trust from 2008 to 2014 (000253-
Exhibit H-Title Commitments for the real estate associated with the 
Trust (000296-419) 
Exhibit I- Checks signed by Defendant David L. Boren (000420-422) 
Exhibit J-BLM Bill Summaries (000423-426) 
Exhibit K- Ledger Entries showing the purchases and expenditures of 
the Trust (000427-428) 
8 
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Exhibit L-Trust Tax Returns for 2008 through 2014 which shows the 
Farm Losses to the Trust along with the Oil and Gas Royalties paid to the 
Trust (000433-566) 
Exhibit M-Defendant David L. Boren's discovery responses (000567-
589). 
The Plaintiffs provided over 350 pages of documents. The Defendant 
argues that a review of these documents require specialized knowledge and 
that Plaintiff Duane Boren, Jr. lacked the necessary expertise. The Court 
should reject the Defendants argument that Duane Boren, Jr. cannot testify 
matters contained in the ledger and tax returns. "[N]o expert testimony is 
required if the matter at issue in the case is one which ... is within the 
knowledge of the average trier of fact, or if the other evidence is such as to 
present the issues in terms which the jury can be expected to understand." 
State, in interest ofK.C., 2013 UT App 201, 309 P.3d 255, 259 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2013) quoting State v. Pavne, 964 P.2d 327,332 (Utah Ct.App.1998) 
A layperson can review the ledger and tax returns provided by Defendant 
David Boren. A person can then compare that information against the 
additional infonnation provided by Defendant David Boren. Line 5 of 2008 
Tax Return shows Royalties in the amount of $38,210. Line 6 shows Fann 
9 
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losses in the amount of $51,107. (000434). The same return has two 
schedules showing both the income (Schedule E 00043 7) and the losses 
(Schedule F 00043 8). To ascertain this information a person has to have the 
ability to read, nothing more. 
Plaintiffs requested "all documents which negate Plaintiffs' claims in 
their Complaint, including breach of Trust and commingling of Trust 
property and personal property". Plaintiffs also requested "all documents 
relating to an accounting of the Trust property" in their discovery requests. 
On April 9th 2015, Defendant David Boren replied to the Plaintiffs' requests 
with: "All such documents were provided in the Plaintiffs and Defendant's 
Initial Disclosures and in the Defendant's First Supplemental Initial 
Disclosures." (000587). Defendant David Boren, provided all relevant 
documents relating to the accounting and commingling of Trust property. A 
layperson is capable of reviewing the ledger which shows that Trust funds 
were used to purchase a dirt bike and a 4 wheeler. A layperson is also 
capable of reviewing the documents provided in discovery and determining 
that there are no documents which show a dirt bike or a 4 wheeler titled in 
the name of the Trust. This information requires no expertise nor is it 
opinion testimony. If Duane Boren, Jr. was incorrect in his statement, it 
10 
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would have easily been refuted by Defendant David Boren producing the 
titles. 
After reviewing the documents, Duane Boren, Jr.' s has the ability to 
state that the Defendant failed to provide "receipts or an accounting for the 
full cattle herd, mineral income distributions, sale of elk and deer permits, · 
and details relating to property management fees." What required a larger 
degree of experience was in organizing the documents provided by the 
Defendants because of the haphazard manner in which they were provided. 
Likewise, the ledger shows multiple expenditures on horses. (000254, 
000256-57, 000259, 000262-63, 000266), yet there is no evidence in the 
documents provided by Defendant David Boren that the Trust owns any 
horses. Duane Boren, Jr. can testify as to these matters after reviewing the 
documents. Further he is also competent to testify that his brother, 
Defendant David Boren, owns horses. 
Duane Boren, Jr. is competent to testify that Defendant David Boren 
signed a Farm Agreement assigning to himself the benefits of the Fann 
because Duane Boren, Jr. also provided the Court with that Fann 
Agreement. (000218 paragraph 21 and 000248-50). Duane Boren, Jr. is also 
competent to testify that the Trust owns only 50% of the Farm, Sherron 
11 
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Boren owns 25% and Defendant David Boren owns 25%. Duane Boren, Jr. 
can testify as to this matter because Duane Boren, Jr. provided the Court 
with the Title Reports showing that information. (000296-419). Yet despite 
this ownership breakdown, the ledger and the Farm Agreement provided by 
Defendant David Boren shows the Trust incurring 100% of the expenses for 
the Farm. A layperson is competent, if they are provided sufficient 
documents, to testify as to this arrangement. Although they were requested, 
there are no records showing the Defendant David Boren shared the 
expenses of the Farm. The statements contained in the Declaration of Duane 
Boren, Jr. were supported by competent evidence and were not outside the 
realm of an ordinary layperson. 
1. A Proper Accounting is Still Required 
Defendant Sherron L. Boren asserts that no further accounting is 
required because the Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that an accounting 
did not occur. There are two problems with this assertion. First, it requires 
that the Plaintiffs prove the negative. That an accounting did not occur. It is 
actually much easier to prove that an accounting did occur by providing the 
evidence of that accounting. Second, the argument is just plain wrong. As 
stated above, Plaintiff Duane Boren, Jr. state in his declaration that 
12 
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Defendant David L. Boren failed to provide "receipts or an accounting for 
the full cattle herd, mineral income distributions, sale of elk and deer 
pennits, and details relating to property management fees." (000217) 
Defendant Sherron L. Boren argues that the Plaintiffs are not entitled 
to an accounting. Defendant relies on paragraph 9 of the Trust Agreement 
and § 7 5-7-811 (3) to support this assertion. The language of paragraph 9 
mandates that the "Trustees shall keep all accounts and records of the trusts 
created herein and annually, or oftener, shall render to the current income 
beneficiaries statements showing all receipts, disbursements, and 
distributions of both principal and income of the trust estate." Utah statute 
requires that 
a trustee shall send to the qualified beneficiaries who request it, 
at least annually and at the termination of the trust, a report of 
the trust property, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements, 
including the amount of the trustee's compensation or a fee 
schedule or other writing showing how the trustee's 
compensation was determined, a listing of the trust assets and, 
if feasible, their respective market values. Utah Code Ann. § 
75-7-811(3). 
The language of the Trust and the language of the statute are not mutually 
exclusive. Under the Trust, Trustee is required to provide an accounting to 
the income beneficiary annually or oftener. Nothing in that paragraph's 
13 
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language overrides, either directly or implicitly, the requirement that the 
Trustee provide an accounting to qualified beneficiaries when requested as 
required by the statute. The paragraph contains no restrictive language that 
restricts this information to the income beneficiary. Instead, the paragraph 
make it mandatory, regardless of any request of the income beneficiary. 
Defendant also argues that the Trust was only required to provide the 
accounting as of the Plaintiffs' first request in 2012. This position 
misrepresents the obligations of a Trustee. The Trustee is obligated to 
maintain adequate records for the Trust regardless of whether any of the 
qualified beneficiaries request those records. See Utah Code Ann. § 7 5-7-
808. Defendant David L. Boren is not liable for failing to provide the 
qualified beneficiaries with the requested information prior to 2012, 
however, once the information is requested, he was obligated to provide it. 
Because the Trustee is obligated to keep these records the Trustee cannot 
seek to limit his responsibilities for maintaining the records only to the time 
after the records were requested. 
2. Defendant David Boren Breached his Duty 
Defendant Sherron L. Boren argues that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant David L. Boren. Brief of 
14 
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Appellee pages 38-42. The Court should disregard Defendant Sherron L. 
Boren's arguments regarding the claims against Defendant David L. Boren. 
Plaintiffs have not sought any damage claims against Defendant Sherron L. 
Boren. She lacks standing to defend Defendant David L. Boren on these 
claims that he acted improperly as Trustee. See generally Haymond v. 
Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 2004 UT 27, 89 P.3d 171 Even if 
Defendant Sherron L Boren is found to have standing, there was sufficient 
evidence to support the Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant David L. Boren. 
A trustee is not permitted to engage in self-dealing, or to place himself 
in a position where it would be for his own benefit to violate his duty to the 
beneficiaries. Wheeler By & Through PVheeler v. Mann. 763 P.2d 758, 759-
60 (Utah 1988). Defendant David Boren has breached his duty in two 
manners at least. First, he has engaged in self-dealing to the extreme. In 
essence, he has run the Fann for his own benefit. There is no evidence that 
the Trust has received any benefit from Defendant David Boren's operation 
of the Farm. The tax returns actually show the opposite. Defendant David 
Boren actually drained assets of the Trust through his operation of the Fann. 
Between 2008 and 2012, the tax returns of the Trust showed losses of 
$51,107(2008), $21,301 (2009), $26,495(2010), $35,010(2011 ), 
15 
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$46,449(2012). In each of those years, the Trust showed income from oil 
royalties in the amounts of $38,210(2008), $17,185(2009), $25,507(2010), 
$32,010(2011), $39,626(2012). (000670-70). Each year, Defendant David 
Boren managed to lose money on the Farm in an amount slightly greater 
than then the reported oil income. It was only after the Plaintiffs began to 
inquire about Defendant David Boren's obligation as a Trustee that the 
business of the Farm miraculously turned around. 
In addition to his operation of the Fann, Defendant David Boren 
failed to keep adequate records on the commingled assets of the Trust. 
Although it is questionable as to whether Defendant David Boren could be 
permitted to commingle his personal assets with those of the Trust, his 
failure to maintain adequate records of these commingled assets is itself a 
breach of his duty as Trustee under Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-808. 
There is adequate evidence that Defendant David Boren breached his 
duty as the Trustee for the Family Trust. The Court should reverse the Trial 
Court on this issue and remand this matter for trial. 
III. THE MOTION TO STRIKE 
1. Duane Boren, Jr.'s Deposition and Declaration are 
consistent 
16 
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Despite the Defendants' assertions to the contrary, Duane Boren, Jr. 's 
Deposition and Declaration are actually consistent with each other. In his 
deposition, Duane Boren, Jr. stated: 
A. I know that there is a lot of farm equipment that is 
missing. I wonder if it is valid for him to set his self up with funds 
from the Trust. I wonder if morn has control of her assets or who has 
control of those. None of that information has been provided in the 
last two years.(000676) 
Q. But your objection is that you haven't been provide 
information that you think you need? 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. No, you don't. 
A. No, I haven't been provided with the information that I 
was wanting. (000677) 
Q. Also you claim that the Trustee failed to provide receipts. 
Do you know if:Mr. Same ever asked for receipts? 
A. Yes, and I couldn't tell you for sure, but I think he 
specifically did because he was aggravated that and state that maybe 
he needed to get to the first grade level with you to get you to under 
what he wanted. (000678) 
In his Declaration, Duane Boren, Jr. stated: 
19. It has taken approximately two years, for the Trustee to 
provide tax returns for the years 2008-14 and accounting. Plaintiff 
still lack receipts or an accounting for the full cattle herd, mineral 
income distributions, sale of elk and deer pennits, and details relating 
to property management fees. 
In both his deposition and his Declaration, Duane Boren, Jr. complains that 
Defendant David Boren failed to provide a complete accounting of Trust 
17 
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property and receipts. He acknowledge receipt of some information, but 
complained that Defendant David Boren withheld necessary information to 
make a full accounting of the Trust. 
Duane Boren, Jr. also complained about missing farm equipment and 
self dealing by Defendant David Boren. Also in his deposition, Duane 
Boren, Jr. stated that Defendant David Boren distributed to himself water 
rights, the brand, cows, hay and equipment. (000677). When asked if there 
was anything else, he qualified his answer with "Probably but I can't think 
of them. (000677). These deposition responses were consistent with Duane 
Boren, Jr.'s Declaration. In paragraph 21 of his Declaration, Duane Boren, 
Jr., provides evidence on the self dealing conducted by Defendant David 
Boren. (000218). Duane Boren, Jr. supported that paragraph by providing 
both the Fann Agreement executed by Defendant David Boren both in his 
capacity as Trustee and as the Farmer entitled to the sole distribution from 
the Fann under the Farm Agreement. (000248-000250). Likewise, Duane 
Boren, Jr. 's Declaration points to the Farm owning substantial equipment, 
yet Defendant David Boren leases the Fann equipment owned by Defendant 
David Boren. (Paragraph 24 and 25 at 000218) and (000259). Likewise, 
Duane Boren, Jr. stated that the Family Trust owns 50% of the property, yet 
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the Family Trust incurred 100% of the costs associated with running the 
Farm. (Paragraph 22 and 26 at 000218). Each of these statements were also 
supported by documents provided by Defendant David Boren in the 
discovery process, which were attached to the Declaration of Duane Boren, 
Jr. Likewise, Duane Boren, Jr. provided ledger provided by Defendant 
David Boren which shows purchases of a dirt bike (000254 entry on 
3/5/2008) and 4 wheeler (000264 entry on 11/8/2010). Again, these 
documents support both Duane Boren, Jr.' s Declaration that Defendant 
David Boren was using Trust money to purchase items for his personal use. 
(000218 paragraph 27) and Duane Boren, Jr. 's deposition testimony that 
Defendant David Boren was using Trust assets for his own benefit. On the 
core issues the Defendant David Boren failed to provide a complete and 
accurate accounting and that Defendant David Boren was engaged in self 
dealing with Trust funds, Duane Boren, Jr's Declaration and Deposition are 
consistent. Because of that consistency, the Court abused its discretion 
when it struck the Declaration of Duane Boren, Jr. 
2. It is clear that Duane Boren Jr. did not take any clear 
positions. 
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The Defendant Sherron L. Boren argues that Duane Boren, Jr.' s 
Declaration needed to offer an explanation as to why there is a discrepancy 
between his deposition testimony and his affidavit. Superficially, the 
Defendant's position may have some merit, except that in this case any 
discrepancy was already explained in the deposition. "The rule that a party 
may not rely on a subsequent affidavit that contradicts his deposition to 
create an issue of fact on a motion for summary judgment does not apply 
when there is some substantial likelihood that the deposition testimony was 
in error for reasons that appear in the deposition or the party-deponent is 
able to state in his affidavit an adequate explanation for the contradictory 
answer in his deposition." Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Utah 1983) 
If a deponent is confused in their deposition, they may point to the portion of 
the deposition which shows the confusion. Gaw v. State ex rel. Dep't of 
Transp., 798P.2d1130, 1138 (Utah Ct.App.1990). Under Webster a party 
may either point to a portion of their deposition which explains a 
discrepancy, or they may offer that explanation in their affidavit. In this 
case, Duane Boren, Jr. cited to the portions of his deposition showing that he 
had not reviewed the relevant documents at that point. That is a sufficient 
explanation for any discrepancy. In his Declaration, Duane Boren, Jr. did 
20 
L Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
state specifically that he had reviewed the infonnation provided by the 
attorney of the Trustee and the tax returns of the Trust. (000218). Again, 
this infonnation is sufficient to explain any purported discrepancies. 
The cases relied on by Defendant Sherron L. Boren are 
distinguishable from this case. In each case, the Deponent in question did 
take a clear position in their deposition. That did not occur in this case. The 
Plaintiffs' Opening Brief cited to their Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant David L. Boren 's Motion to Strike which contained the following 
exchange :from Duane Boren, Jr. 's deposition: 
A. I know that there is a lot of farm equipment that is 
missing. I wonder if it is valid for him to set his self up with funds 
from the Trust. I wonder if mom has control of her assets or who has 
control of those. None of that information has been provided in the 
last two years. 
Q. You just told me that you haven't looked at anything that 
Mr. Sam or your present counsel has given you? 
A. When I went and visited with him a few time and we 
went over a few subjects and one of them was the accounting which I 
don't consider to be a valid accounting and he did not either. 
Q. Mr. Sam didn't? 
A. No. 








Did you read the tax returns? 
Some of them yes. 
Did you read the accounting or just go through it with 
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A. No, I didn't go through them with Mr. Sam. When I got 
copies from him before I sent them to Mr. Monahan I looked through 
them or skimmed through them. 
Q. What you have done is basically just skimmed over 
documents that you had requested? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But your objection is that you haven't been provide 
information that you think you need? 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. No, you don't. 
A. No, I haven't been provided with the information that I 
was wanting. 
Q. But you only skimmed over what you have got? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Your complaint alleges that David has stolen and 
embezzled Trust assets. \Vhat facts support that claim? 
A. The lack of facts. 
Q. Do you have any facts showing that David has stolen or 
embezzled Trust assets? 
A. No. 
Q. You also alleged that David has distributed Trust assets 
to himself. What Trust assets has David distributed to himself? 
A. Water rights, the brand, cow, hay, equipment. 
Q. Anything else? 
A. Probably but I can't think of them. (000676-000677) 
Later Duane Boren, Jr. provided the following testimony: 
Q. Anything else that supports you position that the 
accounting are not complete? 
A. There is nothing to them. 
Q. Anything else? 
A. No. 
Q. In fact all you have done is skim over them haven't you? 
A Yes. That is why I have Mr. Monahan.(000678) 
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This exchange is important because it shows that Defendants were on 
notice that Duane Boren, Jr. had only skimmed the documents that had been 
provided. Duane Boren, Jr. specifically indicated that he was having his 
attorney review the documents. No rational personal, having been told that 
information, could reasonably rely Duane Boren, Jr. 's statements that no 
facts existed which would support the Plaintiffs' claims. It is only "when a 
party takes a clear position in a deposition, that is not modified on cross-
examination, he may not thereafter raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit 
which contradicts his deposition, unless he can provide an explanation of the 
discrepancy." Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983). In this 
case, Duane Boren, Jr. did not modified his position on cross examination, 
he modified it on direct examination. He notified the Defendants that at the 
time of his deposition, he was waiting for his attorney to review the 
documents provided by the Defendants. The Defendants knew that Duane 
Boren, Jr. was not talcing a clear position on what facts may exist until after 
the review of the documents. 
The Court should reverse the Trial Court because Duane Boren, Jr. 
took no clear position in his deposition. Any discrepancy between his 
deposition and his declaration were explained during his deposition .. 
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IV. A TI'ORNEY'S FEES 
Because the Trial Court improperly struck the Declaration of Duane Boren, 
Jr. and because the Trial Court improperly granted summary judgment, this 
Court should reverse the Trial Court's grant of attorney's fees. Absent a 
complete affirmation of the Trial Court's orders, this Court should not grant 
additional fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs have standing to pursue this matter. The Court of 
Appeals should reverse the Trial Court's ruling on the Motion to Strike the 
Declaration of Duane Boren, Jr. After considering the evidence contained 
within that Declaration, the Court of Appeals should reverse the Trial 
Court's grant of Summary Judgment. Finally, The Court of Appeals should 
reverse the Trial Court's grant of attorney's fees pending further resolution 
of this matter. 
Dated: October 17, 2016. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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